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In the twentieth century, the ideas of Nicholas of Cusa have been
made popular again by philosophers like Ernst Cassirer and Hans
Blumenberg1. Very few theologians have paid serious attention to
the ideas of Cusanus. Of course, Rudolf Haubst has written trea-
tises on some theological topics in Cusanus’ work2. His findings
did not get a theological reception though. Karl Jaspers’ introduc-
tion has been much more important in that respect3. For the main
part, theologians have been dependent on philosophical approaches
to the Renaissance thinker. However, the central role he plays in
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics has yet, with the
notable exception of Louis Dupré, failed to influence both philoso-
phers and theologians4. In this article, I will show the importance of
the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa for Balthasar’s theological aes-
thetics5. I will then describe Cusanus’ key position in Balthasar’s
account of the history of metaphysics and discuss Cusanus’ aesthet-
ics within the context of the philosophy of his time. Finally, I will
emphasise the influence of his aesthetics on Balthasar’s theology,
1E. Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren
Zeit , Erster Band, Darmstadt 1994 (19223), 21-61; H. Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der
Neuzeit , Frankfurt am Main 19882, 558-638.
2His essays are collected in: R. Haubst, Streifzüge in die cusanische Theologie, München
1991.
3K. Jaspers, Nikolaus Cusanus, München 1987 (1964).
4H.U. von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische Ästhetik, Band III,1: Im Raum der
Metaphysik , Einsiedeln 1965 (from now on Herrlichkeit), 552-592. Balthasar has influenced
the work of L. Dupré, Passage to modernity. An essay in the hermeneutics of nature and
culture, New Haven 1993.
5Cfr. H.U. von Balthasar, Warum wir Nikolaus Cusanus brauchen, in: Neue Zürcher
Nachrichten 60 , [Beilage Christliche Kultur 28], Nr. 29, 14 August 1964.
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philosophically and theologically.
1 Balthasar’s idea of the history of metaphysics: before
and after Cusanus
Balthasar’s treatise on Cusanus is an attempt to determine his phi-
losophy as a re-assimilation and completion of classical philosophy.
At the same time, it is a radical renewal of classical thought, by
which Cusanus, according to Balthasar, has set the tone for modern
philosophy. Therefore, Balthasar’s systematic analysis of Cusanus’
metaphysics must be understood in his account of the historical
context of philosophical developments before and after Cusanus.
As Balthasar is working on the first volumes of Herrlichkeit , he
writes a small book dedicated to, what he calls a mysticism of love6.
In it, he describes the love of God as the light of the world. Because
of the theme of light, but also because of themes like ‘perception
of love’ and ‘love as revelation’, he calls Glaubhaft an outline of
his main work on aesthetics. His aesthetics does not deal with the
disinterested contemplation (Interesselosigkeit) of Christian philos-
ophy, but with the perception of, and the enrapturement by the
glory of God. As such, it is comparable to Scheler’s personalist
phenomenology, combined with a theology of sainthood. The atti-
tude of the saints, which he will come to regard as the metaphysics
of holy reason in Herrlichkeit , and which is described there as a re-
ceptivity to eternity, has been lost in modern philosophy, according
to Balthasar.
In Glaubhaft , Balthasar describes the classical and modern pe-
riods as the age of the cosmological reduction and anthropological
reduction respectively, and goes on to claim that God’s everlasting
love cannot be thought of from either perspective alone7. God’s love
can only be thought of as the coherence of eternity and individu-
ality. Balthasar argues that philosophy should never have traded
its cosmological starting points for mere anthropological starting
points. According to him, it should have attempted to imagine the
6H.U. von Balthasar, Glaubhaft is nur Liebe, Einsiedeln 1963.
7Balthasar does not strictly distinguish between a cosmological and an anthropological
period , but the period before the Renaissance is generally classified by him as ‘cosmological’
and the period after the Renaissance ‘anthropological’. However, authors such as Boehme,
Hegel and Schelling are classed by him as part of the cosmological reduction as well.
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union of the classical and the modern, a union leading to the heart
of western thought.
1.1 Metaphysical developments before Cusanus
Cusanus’ philosophy reincorporates the original forms of thought as
they were articulated in Greek philosophy, according to Balthasar.
The days of Scholasticism are over, and Balthasar remains highly
critical of this period. Cusanus and Balthasar would both agree
that there could be no such thing as a scientific theology, for true
theology cannot be captured in books or arguments. There can be
no scientific doctrine of God next to a mystical doctrine of God.
This is why, according to Balthasar, two types of metaphysics can
be distinguished in the history of mythology, philosophy and reli-
gion toward the end of the Middle Ages: the metaphysics of saints
and the metaphysics of fools. Both types signify a return to the
metaphysical questions of the classical world, in which the ontolog-
ical problem of unity and diversity is developed8. However, both
types of metaphysics do not simply mean a restoration of classical
thought. They are an attempt to reflect upon the religious and
mythical foundation of the Christian unity of late mediaeval cul-
ture. According to Balthasar, they should be seen as a follow-up
of Neoplatonism, a philosophical movement he has both criticised
and adopted in his theology9.
Balthasar distinguishes the following types of metaphysics in the
late Middle Ages, asserting their influence far into the modern age.
First, he distinguishes the metaphysics of the saints, also called
metaphysics of holy reason. This type of metaphysics can be found
especially in the thought of Eckhart, Tauler and Ruusbroec, which
8Herrlichkeit III,1 , 371-551.
9“Der packende protestantische Ernst, der sich gern durch abfällige Äußerungen über den
“ästhetischen” Unernst im katholischen Raum zu decken vermag und gewiß überall dort recht
hat, wo biblische Betrachtung unvermerkt in “neuplatonische” ästhetische Kontemplation
absinkt , wird doch seinerseits stets an die Gottherrlichkeit verwiesen werden müssen, von
der die objektive Offenbarung voll ist.”. Balthasar adds a note to the word ‘absinkt’: “Ich
mußte darauf gefaßt sein, ehe man mich auch nur ausreden ließ, zum alten neuplatonischen
Eisen geworfen zu werden.” Herrlichkeit III,1 , 17-18. Balthasar is responding to a book
review by H.E. Bahr - himself an author on theological aesthetics - who calls Herrlichkeit a
return to the period before Thomas (Balthasar adds an exclamation mark when he quotes
this line) and at the same time a renewed Neoplatonic-Christian mysticism. Balthasar
himself is the cause of this confusion, by including, among others, Platonists in the origins
of western thought and with this of the Christian theology of revelation. Herrlichkeit III,1 ,
958-964.
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Balthasar characterises by indifferentia. It is mainly developed by
the mystics in the period between Thomas and the Renaissance and
re-emphasises the themes of the Greek tragedies. The core idea is
that being human means ‘suffering’. This should be understood
as the true characteristic of finitude and therefore as a physical,
but above all a spiritual feature. The person, who suffers, can do
nothing but to resign herself to her being and fate. The theme
of ‘resignation’ has often been forgotten in Christian philosophy,
according to Balthasar, because Christian thought is a continuation
of classical philosophy, which has forgotten to digest the themes
of the Greek tragedies. This is why Christendom does not use
the tragic resignation, but the ‘way’ of Christ for interpreting and
undergoing suffering. However, undergoing suffering has always
been interpreted in a metaphysical sense as well, as a deliverance
of the finite beings into an infinite being, as exaltation from being-
image to being-without-image, as being accepted into the world
of the eternal light. Following Thomas, the theme of resignation
gained a different, more active meaning, viz. that of the intellectual
openness of the intellectus agens .According to Balthasar, Eckhart
has interpreted this intellectual openness of humans to God as an
intellectual ‘freedom’ - not the freedom of the will - and has cleared
the way for the dangers of modernity, in which the freedom of people
is seen as separate from the freedom of God10. This modern position
means the end of the metaphysics of the saints, which advocates the
selfless vision of the divine glory and therefore always sees its own
freedom within the framework of divine freedom.
Second, he distinguishes the metaphysics of foolish reason, which
he characterises by Geworfenheit . This metaphysics has mainly
been developed further in the works of Cervantes, Shakespeare and
Dostoevski and the paintings of Rouault. If the world of classical
tragedy can be characterised by melancholy, the world of the fool
certainly cannot be characterised in the same way. Saints experi-
ence a chasm between finitude and infinity or use contemplation to
ascend into the intangible infinite light. In literature, the difference
between God and humans often only finds its expression in simple
man, the fool or the clown. Quite often, saints and heroes are ac-
companied by these fools. Furthermore, saints and heroes show a
great resemblance to the fools, in the forms of a contemplation that
10Herrlichkeit III,1 , 407-491, esp. 407-410.
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sometimes leads to madness, a temporary experience of hell, or in
the often abnormal gestures and rituals that have to be performed
to bridge the chasm with eternity11.
The passivity of both types of metaphysics reaches its completion
with Ignatius of Loyola, according to Balthasar. Ignatius consid-
ered the passivity and the spontaneity of the human intellect to be
one. Those that deny the activity and the spontaneity of the hu-
man mind in the light of the divine revelation, or even dismiss it as
mere foolery, will quickly identify the analogy of Creator and crea-
ture with the contradiction of the sinful and apostate human and
the delivering and atoning God. Both the metaphysics of the saints
and the metaphysics of the fools have been guilty of searching for
divine glory in the world in the form of something unmediated and
supernatural. Later, these two forms are joined by a third form
of metaphysics which, like the other two, is too quick in institu-
tionalising the chasm between God and humans (this should have
been the subject of the third part of Herrlichkeit III,2, which was
never published), and also has its foundation in pre-scholastic phi-
losophy: The metaphysics of the reformers, characterised by being
‘unmediated’.
1.2 Metaphysical developments after Cusanus
Balthasar proposes that the modern age - fifteenth century Human-
ism, sixteenth century Renaissance, seventeenth century Baroque,
and eighteenth century Enlightenment to nineteenth century Ger-
man Idealism - has three main themes which are addressed in three
different metaphysical variants, again finding their origin in clas-
sical thought, but leading to a loss of divine glory. First, there is
the continuing mediation of classical thought (Origen, Augustine,
Boëthius, Eriugena, Dante). This Neoplatonic line in the history of
philosophy has always related best to Christian thought, according
to Balthasar, because it regards the world as revelation, and thereby
questions the division between the world and the cosmos. Christ,
being the divine or cosmic revelation, would be the answer to the
question for the relation of the world and the cosmos. However, the
modern age does not return to this ‘naive classical relation to the
11Herrlichkeit III,1 , 492-551, esp. 492-496.
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divine’, as he calls it, and therefore a new speculative doctrine of
God has been developed.
The second theme of modernity is a new speculative doctrine of
God. The new doctrine of God, developed by Plotinus and subse-
quently reinterpreted in a Christian way by Augustine, assumes a
direct experience between the finite and the infinite self. Not un-
til Eckhart, does this experience gain its full meaning of diffidence
and veneration by means of the direct vision ofGod, which is seen
as the mystagogical way. Balthasar argues that Eckhart could not
have foreseen that the combination of both themes - cosmos/world
and the inward witnessing of God - would lead to the loss of divine
glory.
Thirdly, Balthasar distinguishes the modern idea of evolution
(Hegel, Feuerbach). Both the abovementioned themes have led to
the idea of evolution or progress. According to Balthasar, the con-
cept of the world is developed within the space of the relation of
the finite and the infinite self, as a result of which the sovereignty
of God and His glory are injured. What is left, is the idea of the
absolute identity of the self and the human search for themselves.
Balthasar’s account of the history of metaphysics seems to be
a rather negative one. According to him, every theme and de-
velopment in modernity he describes have led to a loss of divine
glory (Herrlichkeitsvergessenheit). However, these developments
have their origin in classical thought. Balthasar’s criticism of philo-
sophical metaphysics therefore is not cynically advocating a return
to premodern times. According to him, the history of metaphysics
is not a history of radical caesuras, but of continuity (with the pos-
sible exception of Nominalism), interpreted by him as a history of
catholicity. In his magnum opus Herrlichkeit , his criticisms are di-
rected towards the application of philosophical concepts to theolog-
ical aesthetics. In modernity, philosophy and theology have become
separate disciplines. A theological aesthetics, based on what he calls
‘innerwordly’ concepts, will confuse natural or artificial beauty with
divine glory. According to Balthasar, Nicholas of Cusa has been
the last philosopher who was able to maintain the coincidence of a
cosmological and anthropological worldview. Especially in his aes-
thetics, there was no radical opposition between the divine Creator
and the artist. Yet, Cusanus established a modern change of roles
in the interplay of the human and the divine.
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2 A reconstruction of Cusanus’ aesthetics
Originally from Kues in Germany, Cusanus stayed at Deventer, in
the Netherlands, with the Brethren of the Common Life, in his early
years. Later in his life, he spent a considerable amount of time in
Italy as a church diplomat. This is where he must have become ac-
quainted with the Italian Renaissance. However, Nicholas preferred
‘mediaeval’ gothic music and painting from the Low Countries, such
as the music of Ockegem and paintings by Rogier van der Weyden
and Hans Memlinc. I will now present a short outline of Cusanus’
aesthetics. I then evaluate the importance of his aesthetics for
Balthasar12.
General histories of aesthetics do not usually mention Cusanus.
Some do mention him merely to mark the beginning of Renaissance
philosophy. His contemporary Marsilio Ficino is much more im-
portant for the history of aesthetics. Nicholas has not devoted a
single work exclusively to art or the concept of beauty. However,
the works of a philosopher like Cusanus, influenced by Neoplaton-
ism, contain many passages that deal with form, light, harmony or
proportion. Edgar De Bruyne thought that Cusanus’ allusions to
beauty and art lack originality. According to DeBruyne, Cusanus’
ideas are interesting only when they are seen in the framework of
his entire philosophical system13. Wladislaw Tatarkiewicz calls Cu-
sanus’ aesthetics a return to Platonism, although he emphasises
that Cusanus lends little weight to the platonic-idealistic starting
points of his aesthetics. He seems to be more interested in the
12I have used the following edition of the translation of the works of Cusanus: Nikolaus von
Kues, Philosophisch Theologische Schriften ( from now on PTS), [3 Bde., lat.−dt.Studien-
und Jubiläumausgabe, hg. und eingef. v. L. Gabriel. übersetzt und kommentiert von
D. und W. Dupré], Freiburg 1964-67; For Cusanus’ biography, E. Meuthen, Nikolaus von
Kues. Skizze einer Biographie, Münster 1964. Other works on Cusanus: M. Alvarez-Gomez,
Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus von Kues, München 1968; W.
Beierwaltes, Identität und Differenz. Zum Prinzip cusanischen Denkens, Opladen 1977;
K. Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues. Problemgeschichtliche Stellung
und systematische Bedeutung , [Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalter-
lichen Philosophie VII], Leiden 1973; R. Haubst, Die Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues,
Freiburg 1956; R. Haubst, Das Bild des Einen und Dreieinen Gottes in der Welt nach Niko-
laus von Kues, Trier 1952; G. Schneider, Gott - Das Nichtandere. Untersuchungen zum
metaphysischen Grunde bei Nikolaus von Kues, 1970; Th. van Velthoven, Gottesschau und
menschliche Kreativität. Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Nikolaus von Kues, Leiden 1977;
K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, Nicolaus Cusanus. Die Philosophie im übergang vom Mittelalter
zur Neuzeit , Frankfurt a.M. 1957.
13E. De Bruyne, Geschiedenis van de aesthetica. De Renaissance, Antwerpen 1951, 227-
229.
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activity of the human mind14.
According to Cusanus, the function of art is to arrange and as-
semble substances (congregat omnia) to give multiplicity and diver-
sity unity and form (unitas in pluritate)15. This method of working
is a creative act. The artist can create a work that does not exist in
nature, for example, when he creates a casket or a spoon from a tree
that was created by nature16. The world in which people live has
therefore been created by both God and humans. There is noth-
ing in this world, which is exclusively natural or artificial. Cusanus
usually uses the artisan as an example of the artist. The work of the
painter still has its example in nature, but the artisan’s work finds
its example in the human mind. The spoon cannot be found in nat-
ural reality. In Cusanus’ days of course, the visual arts produced
images and representations of natural reality. Cusanus’ choice of
the artisan is not unique in the history of aesthetics17. However,
his interpretation of the artisan’s work, capable of creating some-
thing new that expresses the creative power of the human mind, is
original. In this respect, Cusanus’ aesthetics does differ from the
mediaeval conception of art as pure productivity and technical skill,
although he does not have a modern conception of art as a separate
discipline.
The creative process of the artist does not start with the creation
of a work of art, but with the vision. Vision is the beginning of all
art. Creation is only a result of this vision. This point of view
is what makes Cusanus so interesting for the beginning of modern
philosophy. Art is not just the work of hands, but also the work
of the human mind. ‘Vision’ should not be interpreted as a mere
sensory act, but also as a mental act. Because vision precedes art
here, Cusanus can be said to have caused a Copernican turn avant la
lettre. Although, in the philosophy of Cusanus, human knowledge
is aimed at objects, the mind is the measure of all things in art.
The work of art completely conforms to the human mind.
The human mind is not capable of creating the absolute pro-
14W. Tatarkiewicz, Geschichte der Ästhetik. III: Die Ästhetik der Neuzeit; Von Petrarca
bis Vico, Basel 1987, 81-86, 82.
15Cusanus also uses both concepts in his philosophy of religion, especially in his philosophy
of religious freedom in De pace fidei, PTS III , 707-796.
16Idiota de mente, PTS III , 490v.
17Similar interpretations of the artisan as an artist can already be found in the works of
Aristotle. W. Tatarkiewicz, Geschichte der Ästhetik. III , 82-84.
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portion, which is the highest norm for a work of art in platonic
philosophy. According to Cusanus, the mind is only capable of
forming conjectures: assumptions or assessments. The proportions
of a work of art are grounded in comparisons performed by the
mind and are therefore always relative. The form one creates out
of substance is only likeness and image (similitudo et imago). This
is what, to Balthasar, is valuable in the works of Cusanus.
3 Human vision as analogy: A philosophical appraisal
“Sein (Cusanus) Entwurf einer Philosophie zwischen Geist und Gott
kann, braucht aber nicht transzendental im modernen Sinn ausge-
wertet zu werden. In der antiken Sicht (als Seinsphilosophie) wie
in der modernen Sicht (als Philosophie des Geistes und der Frei-
heit) gilt Nikolaus’ Denkanstrengung immerfort dem Vollzug der
analogia entis”18.
According to Balthasar, Cusanus is the starting point for a phi-
losophy of mind based on classic thought. The analogia entis , which
according to him formally started by Plotinus, is completed by Cu-
sanus introducing the creativity of the human mind. Analogia entis
is the expression of the first philosophical act, Balthasar argues.
He uses Cusanus’ language: seeing the complicatio in the explica-
tio. “Gott ist alles in Allem, weil er uneinholbar alles über Allem
ist.” A human being always has a one-sided vision of the One ex-
panded in all and at the same time, he sees that the One can never
be fully expanded. In this sense, one sees the invisible in the visible.
There can only be a world next to a God who is already everything,
if and only if God is thought of as being above everything. This
simultaneity can only be grasped in an imperfect way, in the form
of a longing.
Cusanus adds such a metaphysics of the desiderium to a meta-
physics of Gelassenheit and a metaphysics of Geworfenheit . As a
philosopher, he calls himself idiota: philosophy is the deepening
and exploration of the understanding that we know nothing. The
more we realise this, the more we start longing. After all, we can-
not long for the longing to stop. The longing for God is fed by the
understanding that He is the Invisible, and the more we realise this,
18Herrlichkeit III,1 , 568-9.
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the more we know God by not knowing (docta ignorantia) and not
seeing Him.
3.1 Cusanus and the analogy of being
According to Balthasar, Cusanus is the last pre-reformation philoso-
pher who reflects upon the paradoxes of the analogia entis . His
concept of coincidentia oppositorum does not mean the coexistence
or combination of contradictions , but rather the coincidence of op-
posites . Incarnation, for example, is the coincidence of God and
creation; the church is the coincidence of historicity and universal-
ity; faith is the coincidence of seeing the invisible and visualising
this vision, etc. The idea of coincidence is an intellectus fidei . For
both Balthasar and Cusanus, the intellectus is always an Anselmian
fides , a search within faith towards faith.
Balthasar does have some questions for Cusanus’ philosophy,
however. Does Cusanus neglect the infinite difference between God
and humans? Does his explanation of the analogia entis mean a
dissolving of the reception of divine glory into a totalitarian, cos-
mological scheme? If so, how could this do justice to the cross,
hell and resurrection? Balthasar argues that despite these dangers
in Cusanus’ philosophy, Nicholas does bring cosmos and gospel to-
gether in a way unique to the modern age. This is why Cusanus,
according to Balthasar, is not just the knot between the old and the
new age. His philosophy is also the concentration of all the images
of God that preceded him in confrontation with the modern idea
of the human mind. Cusanus’ God is at the same time the One
(Plotinus), the Shining One (Homer), the Dark One (Sophocles),
the Longing (Virgil) and the biblical God. For Plotinus, Proclus
and Eriugena, the world is the appearance of the non-appearing
God. Eckhart has interpreted God’s non-appearance in a Christian
way as His absolute freedom. Cusanus has continued the theme of
the divine freedom, e.g. in the themes of Love and the Bride.
3.2 Glory and analogy
The appearance of the divine glory in the world is developed on
two analogous levels by Cusanus. First, on a trinitarian level: The
relation between the divine Love and the human mind appears in
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the glory between Father and Son. ‘Glory’ in this case is the mutual
giving and receiving of love. Second, on an innerworldly level: The
God-world relation in Christ is present in the mystery of the Spirit
in the Church. Trinitarian glory appears in the church because of
the working of the Spirit in the human mind. The analogy of the
trinitarian relation and the innerwordly relation between God and
humans is already founded in the philosophical works of Cusanus.
I will now present this philosophical foundation based on its treat-
ment by Balthasar.
Cusanus describes the infinite forming principle of all forms in
the world as the Primal Image, which appears in the human mind as
the truth of every image, as measure (harmony, proportion,number)
and foundation. This Primal Image is an infinite living Person - for
it appears to the human mind as a spirit - not just as a worldly
being - that thinks and speaks. The sensory world can therefore be
represented as a book or a text that can be read, and that contains
the words God has spoken to the world through his Son. His Word
is heard in every sound.
Each creature should be understood as an intention, a resolve
to be understood as divine self-communication. People, who see
themselves as a creature and the world as creation, understand
themselves and the world they live in as divine self-communication.
Because of this Cusan image, Balthasar finds a double aesthetical
dimension in the works of Cusanus. Firstly, a material or horizontal
aesthetics that is characterised by consonantia: All sounds in the
world are only heard in imitation of each other, belonging together
like in a melody in which every note has its place, a simultaneous
preceding and proceeding. The world could not be understood as
world if the different tones within the melody, the different words,
would not be heard in a sentence or meaning19. Secondly, a formal
or vertical aesthetics that is characterised by claritas and resplen-
dentia: The things in the world could not be seen if there was no
light that illuminated them. Things get that clarity from the reflec-
tion of something else which is not a thing itself, but a light, which
can only be seen indirectly however invisibly via an object in the
world.
19Here, the doctrine of the docta ignorantia resounds: All knowledge is only knowledge
because of a preceding knowledge. All new knowledge can only come into existence because
of the application of a measure, formed by what we already know.
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Balthasar claims that Cusanus attributes a transcendental beauty
to a person simultaneously in the form of a having (in a spiritual
way) and in the form of being (as being-spirit) based on the cohe-
sion between the horizontal and the vertical aesthetics. According
to Cusanus, the human mind has the ability to behold the world as
the appearance of the non-appearing God (and with it beholding
God Himself) and as such, as spirit, a person is a created image of
the divine primal beauty. Seeing oneself as the image of God, this
person understands his or her seeing of God in the world as an im-
age of how God sees people and everything else in the world. This
intellectual vision consequently, is the image of God. The human
mind only becomes beautiful when it is itself, i.e. when it has a
mental self-awareness of itself as beautiful. A person sees the world
and him or herself as an image. With this, he or she sees the Cre-
ator of the image, after which follows the insight that only the act
of seeing itself, makes a person into an image. Seeing God is seeing
the divine glory in worldly beauty, which also includes people.
Knowledge of worldly beauty is no guarantee for knowledge of
the divine glory. On the contrary, glory can only be seen if the
divine light breaks through in the world. Only then, one realises
that, although glory cannot be defined conceptually, it can be com-
prehended in an incomprehensible way. This comprehension only
exists in the coincidence of the descend of identity into non-identity
and the ascent of non-identity into identity. For Cusanus, analogy
is evocat idem nonidem in idem20. In other words, faith alone, and
not one’s own conceptual capabilities, enables one to become specu-
lator majestatis , but the human mind realises this, while the mind
already has faith when it does so.
3.3 Analogy as negative theology
How does the horizontal aesthetics in the world, expressing itself
in proportion and number (analogia proportionalitatis), relate to
the vertical aesthetics that expresses itself in terms of light (analo-
gia attributionis)? Between God and the created world, we find
the created spirit which, just like the Creator, is also the light and
20W. Schulze, Zahl, Proportion, Analogie. Eine Untersuchung zur Metaphysik und Wis-
senschaftshaltung des Nikolaus von Kues, [Buchreihe der Cusanusgesellschaft, Bd. VII, Hrsg.
von R. Haubst, E. Meuthen und J Stallmach], Münster 1978, 232-242.
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principle of all things. According to Cusanus, the spirit is a di-
vinenumber, which can express the relation between God and the
world. The inadequacy of that expression corresponds to the inad-
equate comprehension of the infinite spirit. Even the inadequacy of
mental expression constitutes a similarity to the difference between
the finite and the infinite spirit. This is a similarity in the face of an
ever-greater dissimilarity. Like the infinite spirit, the human mind
has the infinite possibility to contemplate, determine and name the
things in the world. This infinite possibility is actualised in a fi-
nite way, however. In as far as the world is beheld by the human
mind, it becomes intelligible that it is seen by the infinite Spirit
and that this seeing of the Spirit constitutes the human freedom of
imagination21.
This is precisely the paradox that expresses the analogy of being,
according to Balthasar: God is everything, and yet the world exists,
not in any way altering the fact that God is everything. God is all in
all, yet he does not coincide with the world, He does not mix with it,
even though He is completely immanent to it. Because God is all in
all the unfolded particularities, in a forever folded, but total way22.
Some Cusanus scholars deny the importance of the analogia entis
in his philosophy. Their main argument is that Cusanus himself
never used the term ‘analogy’. He did use the word ‘proportio’
however, e.g. in finiti ad infinitum proportio non est . Especially
in that last statement, Cusanus seems to deny the analogy of the
infinite and the finite. Others argue that Cusanus’ metaphysics is
a metaphysics of unity instead of difference, in which there would
be no room for analogy. Moreover, all inner-worldly characteristics
ascribed to God should be regarded in a metaphorical sense only23.
Balthasar however, also interprets Cusanus’ doctrine of the Non-
Other analogously. The beings in the world relate to other things
as being different. God can never be such an opposite, for He
21“Apparuisti mihi Domine aliquando ut invisibilis ab omni creatura, quia es Deus abscon-
ditus infinitus. Infinitas autem est incomprehensibilis omni modo comprehendi. Apparuisti
deinde mihi, ut ab omnibus visibilis, quia in tantum res est, in quantum tu eam vides. Et
ipsa non esset actu nisi te videret. Visio enim praestat esse, quia est essentia tua. Sic Deus
meus es invisibilis pariter et visibilis. Invisibilis es uti tu es, visibilis es uti creatura est, quae
in tantum est, in quantum te videt.” De visione Dei XII, PTS III , 142.
22Herrlichkeit III,1 , 571.
23R. Haubst, Nikolaus von Kues und die analogia entis, in: Streifzüge in die cusanische
Theologie, [Buchreihe der Cusanusgesellschaft, Sonderbeitrag zur Theologie des Cusanus,
Hrsg. von R. Haubst, E. Meuthen und J Stallmach], Münster 1991, 232-242.
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is never just a particular being, according to Cusanus. On the
contrary, he is not different, the Non-Other, because beings are no
more than what they are, and because we keep noticing the other
in the world, which supposes the Non-Other. How else would we
be able to imagine the other? Both moments of non-otherness, of
the things in the world itself (identity) and of the possibility to
think of things in such a way (the idea of Non-Aliud), reflect two
moments in Cusanus’ aesthetics. The identity of the world is the
consonantia of the material or horizontal aesthetics. The idea of
Non-Aliud is the claritas and resplendentia of the formal or vertical
aesthetics, which can be read from things as the appearance of the
Non-Appearing.
According to Cusanus, coincidentia oppositorum can only be
understood as convergence (non-otherness). This convergence or
analogy is expressed by Cusanus as reduplication: omne ens non
entiter, essentia essentiarum, etc. This is how he avoids taking a
pantheistic stance. The analogy of being does not just apply to all
beings in the world, it also applies to all (metaphysical) knowledge:
Only in the idea of God, things can get their exactness.
4 Seeing the present God: A theological critique
The problems Cusanus exposed in his philosophical epistemology
are solved theologically in De visione Dei, De Possest and De apice
theoriae. However, according to Balthasar, these theological texts
still have a philosophical style. They are mostly influenced by the
philosophy of Plotinus and Proclus. Plotinus regarded the con-
tingency of finitude as the worldly pendant of absolute freedom.
Aesthetically, finitude could then be understood as the unselfish
radiation of the Good. According to Balthasar, Cusanus could in-
terpret this unselfish act in the light of the Person and the Love of
God as Creator and revelation, without any hesitation. The con-
sequence however, would be that he had to carefully fit his philo-
sophical elaboration of the analogy of being into Christian doctrine,
especially into the doctrine of God.
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4.1 Analogy as positive theology
Cusanus interprets God’s incomprehensibility in negative theology
within the framework of an even greater incomprehensibility of the
divine love24. God’s Love reveals itself to human beings, because
God wants it, even though it is not necessary. Subsequently, human
beings are free to comply with this divine free will. Balthasar ar-
gues that this conquers the position of negative theology of classical
thought25. In Christian theology, God’s negative incomprehensibil-
ity is transformed into a positive incomprehensibility. The analogy
of love shows that the relation to God is not mere determinism,
but also an act of free will of human beings. This relation to God,
which Augustine once described as “Videntem videre”, is described
by Cusanus in De visione Dei (1453) by means of the famous ex-
ample of a portrait that keeps looking at the beholder26. An insight
into God’s love is provided by means of the metaphor of vision.
In De visione Dei, Cusanus attempts to introduce the monks
of Tegernsee to mystical theology. He will try to explain the inac-
cessible light of God, which transcends any sensory, rational and
intellectual comprehension, however in terms within their intellec-
tual grasp. He does this by means of the self-portrait of Rogier
van der Weyden, which has been painted in such a way that the
portrayed appears to be able to look at everything and everyone.
Cusanus calls this: ‘the image of God’27. The gaze of the person in
the portrait moves to a position in such a way that it also moves to
all other positions simultaneously. It looks as if it moves, without
moving itself, as if it sees everything at the same time. Therefore,
it is an image of God.
Balthasar calls the idea that is illustrated in the example of the
24“Et haec est gaudiosissima comprehensio amantis, quando incomprehensibilem amabili-
tatem amati comprehendit. Nequaquam enim tantum gauderet se amare secundum aliquod
comprehensibile amatum, sicut quando sibi constat amat amabilitatem esse penitus im-
mensurabilem, infinibilem, interminabilem ac incomprehensibilem. Haec est gaudiosissima
incomprehensibilitatis comprehensibilitas.” Idiota de sapientia 1, PTS III , 432.
25For the opposite position, see Th. P. Tighe, A neglected feature of Neoplatonic meta-
physics, in: P.J. Casarella and G.P. Schner, s.j., Christian spirituality and the culture of
modernity. The thought of Louis Dupré, Grand Rapids/Cambridge 1998, 27-49.
26PTS III , 93-219. Especially in the praefatio and chapters I to III. See also 3.4.
27In his text, Cusanus refers to a large panel on which Rogier Van der Weyden has painted
himself among a large group of people. He is the only one looking at the beholder. This
panel used to hang in the city hall of Brussels, but it no longer survives. A Gobelin copy
of the panel can be found in the Bern museum. Cusanus sent the brothers of Tegernsee a
similar portrait.
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gaze ‘biblical’, although he argues that Cusanus has worked it out
in a Plotinian way, in the form of the reduplications: God is the
face of all faces, the vision of all visions, etc. However, the idea is
also biblical, because the vision of God is not just determined as a
being, but also as Love and Compassion28. Cusanus transforms the
analogy of being into an analogy of freedom and love. According
to Balthasar, this was not the case in Eckhart’s theology, which
he criticises for identifying being and God. In Cusanus’ theology,
the relation to God is borne by the free and simultaneous choice of
both God and humans29. Cusanus places this biblical idea into the
Plotinian scheme quite stubbornly, according to Balthasar.
A person’s vision of God is contained in God’s vision of the
person. Every human vision sees the divine truth in a human way.
In that sense, one does not see anything but one’s own truth. Yet,
in another sense, this is also the divine truth in as far as there can
be nothing but truth in the divine truth. Otherness and difference
however, only belong to the image and to human vision. With
regard to God Himself, human vision can be nothing but the vision
of God30. One knows, however, that this seeing of God is only seeing
one’s own truth. Because of this, a person knows that what he or she
comprehends by seeing is only comprehended because he or she is
seen. Therefore, it is a way of comprehending the incomprehensible.
The completion of the relation to God in the person seen by God is
what Balthasar points out as the introduction of the Pauline idea
by Cusanus (Gal. 4,9; 1 Cor. 8,3; 2 Cor 5,11; Phil. 3,12)31. Human
beings regard themselves as being an image and they know that as
such they are not the truth, but are created by God, Who is Truth
itself. The truth of being human is nothing more and nothing less
than the truth of being an image of Truth itself.
28Herrlichkeit III,1 , 577.
29“Man sieht.....daß Gottes reine Hingegebenheit erst aufgenommen sein wird, wenn auch
der Mensch sich frei- personal zu Gott ent-schlossen haben wird, in einer Wahl zugleich
Gottes und seiner selbst.” Herrlichkeit III,1,2 , 578.
30“Omnis igitur facies, quae in tuam potest intueri faciem nihil videt aliud aut diversum
a se, quia videt veritatem suam. Veritas autem exemplaris non potest esse alia aut diversa,
sed illa accidunt imagini, ex eo, quia non est ipsum exemplar.” De visione Dei VI, PTS III ,
112.
31Herrlichkeit III,1 , 578.
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4.2 Created in the image of the possibility to be
In De Possest (1460), Cusanus emphasises that God’s Being and
his infinite potential Being coincide. According to Balthasar, the
difference with Thomas’ distinctio realis is that the possibility of
the human-made image of God is clarified by means of an identity
of God as actus purus and the idea of otherness. Since worldly
being does not coincide with possible being, there must be a posi-
tion where being and possibility coincide. This is God’s position.
Therefore, the creation of an image of God is an act by the created,
which, although it is founded on the act of creation of the Creator,
is infinitely different from it. However, according to Balthasar, Cu-
sanus also departs from the tradition of negative theology, because
the creation appears as the positive intention of the Creator. This
appearance is founded on seeing - which is not the same as having
a comprehensive view of - the infinite possibilities of the human
mind.
Otherness can only be thought of because of the distinction be-
tween possibility and impossibility, which can be made based on the
image in which being and potential being coincide. The wherefore
of things in themselves can never be constituted by the creature.
The essence of the otherness of something is always formulated in
the sense of being non-other than what it is. A creature can never
answer why something is nothing but that which it is. If this were
possible, the creature would become creator. Balthasar identifies
this as the point in Cusanus’ philosophy where the real problems
arise. He acknowledges, however, that Cusanus wants to maintain a
classical metaphysical position with the analogy of being as its cen-
tral idea, without ignoring the biblical-Christian body of thought.
The problem of the Creator-creature points back to the idea of
Thomas, who regarded creation both as emanatio and as receptio,
Balthasar argues. ‘Emanation’ is the classical aspect of the analogy
of being, looking at creation as the emanation of the fullness of
being of God. ‘Reception’ is the Christian aspect of the analogy
of being, in as far as people’s free act of receiving corresponds to
the free Potential Being of God. The potential only reveals itself in
being in as far as the ability to see this revelation corresponds to
the infinite being, without this infinite being being totally enclosed
in the ability to see infinite possibilities. In the idea of emanation,
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God is dependentupon Himself. In the idea of reception, God’s
infinite Love, without which there could be no Love, is responded
to32.
According to Balthasar, Cusanus’ concept of possesse33. is more
than the simplicity of being. It is the concept of being infinitely
predominated by itself and therefore the openness of the totality of
being, wherein God even without Himself can be Himself. In this re-
spect, Cusanus differs from Plato and Plotinus, who raised the idea
of the Good above that of Being, to be able to understand why Be-
ing should be understood as manifestation. Furthermore, Cusanus
differs from Eckhart, who thinks God is Being because He is Spirit
and Freedom. He even assimilates and adapts the Anselmian ‘id
quo maius cogitari’ . The vision of the human mind gets its final
positive confirmation vis-à-vis God’s incomprehensibility: not just
founded on the intangibility of His infinite greatness, but also on
the glory of His Love and Majesty34.
According to Balthasar, Cusanus’ position not only differs from
negative theology, but also from positive theology35. If Cusanus
regards human desire to behold the divine glory as an intellectual
transcendental possibility, there is a greater intimacy of the human
desire and divine self-revelation in his works than in those of the Fa-
thers. Cusanus uses the classical scheme of the dynamics of divine
Eros, because the dynamics of human reason cannot be recovered in
the world. In Cusanus’ works, however, this idea never veers into an
32Herrlichkeit III,1 , 580.
33Best translated by ‘the possibility to be’ or even better: ‘the freedom to be’.
34“Collige igitur haec, ut videas omnia ad hoc ordinata, ut mens ad posse ipsum quod videt
a remotis, currere possit et incomprehensibile meliori quo potest modo comprehendat, quia
posse ipsum est solum potens, cum apparuerit in gloria maiestatis satiare mentis desiderium.”
De apice theoriae, PTS II , 372.
35De Deo abscondito, PTS I , 299-309. This dialogue between a Christian and an heretic is
about the absence of God, but does not emphasise a negative theology: “Christian: I know,
that everything I know is not God, and that everything I imagine is not like Him, but that He
is beyond everything. Heretic: So, nothing is God. C: He is not nothing, because this nothing
has a name: nothing. H: If He is not nothing, than He must be something. C: Neither is
He something. After all, something is not everything. God, on the other hand, is not rather
something than that He is everything. H: It is amazing what you are claiming about the
God you worship: That He is neither nothing, nor something. It is incomprehensible. C:
Well, God is beyond nothing and beyond something. After all, nothing obeys Him to become
something. And therein consists His omnipotence, by which He is beyond everything that
is or is not, so that everything that is or is not obeys Him. He is nothing of everything that
is below Him; He is nothing of everything that He in His omnipotence precedes. Therefore,
it cannot be claimed that He is rather this than that. After all, everything originates from
Him.” PTS I , 303. (Transl. SvE).
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attitude of indifference and resignation like that of the metaphysics
of the saints. The desire is maintained, despite the realisation of
imperfection. However, human desire is only possible thanks to
divine grace, which is God’s personal self-revelation in the world.
This is where classical thought effortlessly changes into Christian
doctrine, Balthasar remarks. The distinction between philosophy
and theology of scholastic thought is cancelled in favour of a clas-
sical metaphysics of totality. However, this entails the danger of
a mystical rationalism in the end, according to Balthasar. He ar-
gues that Christology should be reintroduced in its Originian form:
Christ will have to be regarded as the presence of the absolute In-
tellect in the creaturely intellect. Thus, faith is enlightened from
within to achieve a better understanding of the mystery of God,
“als Sonne der Geister ”36.
5 Balthasar’s primacy of catalogical vision
I have shown Balthasar’s discussion of Cusanus’ thought in two
parts, philosophically and theologically. According to Balthasar,
Cusanus has succeeded in developing modern impulses in philoso-
phy. Yet, he has also assimilated elements of classical philosophy.
Central to Balthasar’s aesthetical approach of Cusanus is the rela-
tion between God and humans. He argues that this relation is best
expressed in the analogy of being. According to him, Cusanus has
found the exact character of analogy: a similarity in the face of an
even greater dissimilarity.
What is most characteristic about the idea of analogy in the
works of Cusanus is the fact that it is borne by the freedom of
both God and humans. Therefore, human freedom should not be
characterised by resignation (Interesselosigkeit) or by being cast
(Geworfenheit) alone, but also by longing. In Cusanus’ philoso-
phy, the longing for God is expressed in the human intellect, which
is capable of comprehending who God is in an incomprehensible
way. God is comprehended as the coincidence of opposites, as an
identity, without being able to lift the differences of thought itself.
Balthasar, acknowledging the importance of Cusanus in the history
of Western thought, also warns against the danger of Cusanus’ phi-
36Herrlichkeit III,1 , 583.
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losophy, which, too hastily emphasises the identity of human and
divine freedom, forgetting that human freedom should be regarded
as being subject to the norm of difference and imperfection.
Nevertheless, Balthasar is of the opinion that Cusanus has suc-
ceeded in gauging the value of identity and difference in the relation
between God and humans because of his use of the aesthetical cat-
egory of vision. Cusanus succeeds in doing so, because he does not
interpret the appearance of God in the world as a mere innerworldly
event. However, he does read it from the innerworldly appearances
and forms. The horizontal aesthetics is thus founded in a vertical
aesthetics. Cusanus characterises human freedom by its unlimited
possibilities, but this limitlessness is also a human inability. For he
can never carry out all of these possibilities, let alone oversee them
all in one glance or consider them in one thought. Seeing God al-
ways remains a longing for God. This constitutes the difference
between God and humans and the paradox of the analogy of being:
One can only see otherness in the world, and only sees this other-
ness as otherness because one knows that God sees the otherness
as nothing but that which it is. The seeing of God should therefore
be thought of as a seeing of non-otherness in the otherness.
The theme of the relation between human and divine freedom is
worked out further in Cusanus’ theological aesthetics. According to
Balthasar, Cusanus does more than stressing the difference between
God and humans and the inadequacy of the human intellect to
know God in a way similar to that of Plotinus or the negative
theology of Dionysius the Areopagite. He also approaches it in a
biblical way. The selflessness with which God sees the world and
through which one can see the divine glory in the world, can only be
understood within the framework of the love of God, which is even
more incomprehensible than His selflessness. Cusanus sees human
freedom as a gift out of love. Thus, he conquers negative theology.
Human beings are capable of a positive confirmation of the love of
God despite the inadequacy of their vision of God. According to
Balthasar, Cusanus’ philosophy is completed in the idea of potential
being. It regards human freedom as both emanation and reception.
A creature has been given an indefinite number of possible ways of
answering the love of God. According to Balthasar, this positive
statement fulfils the idea of a biblical interpretation of the analogy
of being in a modern philosophical framework.
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The intelligibility of the world is founded in its infinite possibility.
The vision of God is a precondition for seeing the world. However,
according to Balthasar, Cusanus is shifting the whole perspective
of theology at this point. Whereas Neoplatonic philosophy used to
ascend from affirmations to negations analogously, Cusanus offers
us the perspective from the incomprehensible God to an expression
in the world in a catalogical descending movement37. However, this
catalogical perspective is assumed in every analogical movement,
but in itself, it is infinitely unapproachable. In other words: Al-
though faith is the condition of meaning and understanding, this
insight cannot be explained otherwise than by understanding itself.
Only within this complex structure of the interwovenness of the
catalogical and analogical movement, it is understandable that in
the Son the Father can be seen (John 14,9). The human nature of
Jesus subsists in his divine personhood, so that nature itself will be
encompassed in this unity of divinity and humanity38. This unity
finds its climax in the cross, where the coincidence of opposites, the
coincidence of catalogy and analogy, is fulfilled by Christ, because
He descends in utmost humility, without losing His divinity39.
6 Conclusion
Balthasar’s main question in his reading of Cusanus is: What is
the importance of the analogy of the human vision of God and
God’s vision of human beings for theology. Can the unity and the
difference of divine vision (the catalogical movement) and being an
image (the analogical movement) provide a solution for the problem
of analogy? Again, the question arises: How can there be a world
apart from God, when God is all in all?
Let us have one final glance at Cusanus’ example of the portrait
to explain the theme of analogy in Balthasar’s aesthetics. First,
Nicholas shows us that people have images of reality, which they
realise, are not reality itself, but only images of it. Seeing and being
37H.U. von Balthasar, Theologik II, Bd. II. Wahrheit Gottes, Einsiedeln 1985, 195.
38De visione Dei 19 , PTS III, “To me, a humble person, You reveal, my God, such a
hidden mystery, that I can understand that humans can’t understand You, Father, unless
through and in your Son, Who is comprehensible and intermediary. And now I understand
that to comprehend You is to become one with You. Humans can become one with You,
through your Son, Who is the medium of unification.” (Transl. SvE)
39H.U. von Balthasar, Theologik II , 194.
A Renaissance of Theological Aesthetics 107
seen, although separate in human images, are associated. From this
follows the insight that it is no use regarding reality as something
completely different from that, which is represented in it. It is for
the sake of this unrepresentable reality that this image is formed.
Conversely, the reality that cannot be represented, can only be
thought of thanks to the image; it cannot be thought of indepen-
dently of the image. Finally, we can conclude that the creation of
images is a constitutive element of being human and his relation
to the reality surrounding him. This human constitutive act is a
limited, yet transcendental method of relating to reality as a whole,
and to God in particular. The creation of an image always only
actualises but one of the many possible configurations of identity
and difference. In this way, one also appears to oneself as an image
and therefore as a limit. It is this observation that makes one sus-
ceptible to the reality in images and the possibilities that appear
in these images.
Limit and difference are the constructive elements of every act of
imagination, and therefore of faith and theology as well. They serve
not to point to whatever lies outside the limits of the image. Nor do
they serve to ascertain that humans are trapped in their own images
from which they will never be able to reach reality. To a certain
extent, image and reality are inextricably intertwined. Reality is
the limit of the image during the creation of the image, because
image and reality never fully coincide. The creation of an image is
the actualisation of one of the many possibilities of imagined reality.
This is how it presents that reality. However, this reality can only be
thought of within the image that actualises it. Therefore, the image
is both limit and possibility of the susceptibility to that reality.
For human beings, seeing precedes the statement of being, be-
cause the practice of seeing is a coincidence of seeing and being
seen. With every perception, humans form the image they have of
reality and therefore of themselves. Typical of the human situation
is that they can go on forever questioning the limits of the image
in which they live, if they want to. According to Cusanus, this fun-
damental infinity is God’s freedom, which is at the same time the
limit of human imagination and the human image. The freedom is
the limit of the image, and one cannot be that freedom itself, but is
constituted by it. God is freedom and humans have freedom. This
freedom is the creativity of human imagination, the ability to keep
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confronting images with each other and by doing so, creating a new
image of oneself and the surrounding reality.
To be able to actualise this human freedom, humans have to
be forever different from the reality that confronts them in images,
and the images they create of reality. This is why being is never
fully constituted by the act of seeing. The fact that human beings
are forever different from the images they behold is the tension
with which they have to live. This tension is the context of human
longing for a potential, which seems to be forever inaccessible. This
inaccessibility should not, however, be characterised by failure and
inability, but by infinite possibility. This infinite possibility is not
some distant ideal that is way beyond the limits of this life. It is
a reality that humans are constantly confronted with and which
constantly emanates from him.
Humans are not simply passive and resigned towards this con-
fronting reality. They meet it repeatedly and actualise it by means
of the image. The image is the presence of the ever-newly created
reality. As such, human imagination is not regulated by the ever-
failing longing for the one or the whole. It is regulated by the desire
to look in the same direction as the image. This direction diverges
into all directions, however. It diverges into many perspectives of
that one reality, which can only spread itself like the gamut of vi-
sions. In doing so, it also draws all these visions to itself.
